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Fellows v. National Enquirer: Limiting
the False Light Invasion of Privacy Tort
Under section 45a of the California Civil Code, a plaintiff who
brings a libel action must prove special damages' if the suit is based
on language that is not libelous on its face. 2 This statute is designed
to protect publishers who make statements that are defamatory only
because of extrinsic facts known to the reader.3 Historically, proof
of special damages was not an element of the common law tort of
false light invasion of privacy, 4 [hereinafter false light] even though
false light claims frequently arise under facts identical to those which
could support a libel claim.5 In Fellows v. National Enquirer,6
however, the California Supreme Court found that the public policy
embodied in Civil Code section 45a applies to false light actions
based upon a defamatory publication.7 In Fellows, the court held
that a false light plaintiff must plead and prove special damages
when the claim is based on language that is defamatory only by
reference to extrinsic facts.8
Part I of this note discusses the legal background of both defa-
mation and false light, and explores the recent development in
1. Special damages are all damages in which the plaintiff alleges and proves injury to
plaintiff's property, business, trade, profession, or occupation, including such amounts of
money as the plaintiff alleges and proves was expended as a result of the alleged libel, and
no other. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(b) (West 1982).
2. Section 45a provides in pertinent part:
A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory
matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel
on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless
the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate
result thereof.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 45a (West 1982).
3. MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 550, 343 P.2d 36, 43 (1959).
For example, if a newspaper falsely published an article which stated that "the murderer lives
at 200 Elm Street," when in fact an innocent person lived at that address, that innocent
person would have been defamed only to the extent that a reader knew that the innocent
person lived at 200 Elm Street. Under Civil Code section 45a, the innocent person would be
unable to recover for defamation without proving special damages.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 18-24.
5. Fellows v. National Enquirer, 42 Cal. 3d 234, 246, 251, 721 P.2d 97, 105, 108, 228
Cal. Rptr. 215, 223, 227 (1986).
6. 42 Cal. 3d 234, 721 P.2d 97, 228 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1986).
7. Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
8. Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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California case law that led to the decision in Fellows. Part II
summarizes the facts of the Fellows case and reviews the decision of
the California Supreme Court. Finally, the legal ramifications of the
opinion in Fellows will be discussed in part III of this note.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Privacy in Tort Law
The development of tort actions for the protection of privacy
interests has been greatly influenced by legal periodicals. 9 Prior to
1890, English and American courts had not expressly granted relief
for a so-called "right of privacy."' 0 A few nineteenth century cases,
however, seemed to imply that a right to privacy existed," and one
legal scholar had articulated the existence of "the right to be let
alone." 12 The tort of invasion of privacy was first suggested by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their acclaimed 1890
Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy.'3 The article
expressed concern with the increasing intrusions of the press upon
the private lives of individuals. 14 The authors argued that these
intrusions necessitated a remedy upon the distinct ground of right to
privacy in order to protect the individual against the unreasonable
infliction of mental pain and distress. 15 In 1960, Dean Prosser un-
dertook an evaluation of over 300 cases decided since the Warren-
Brandeis article and determined that the invasion of privacy theory
9. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 849
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. Legal scholars have had considerable
difficulty defining the term "right of privacy." See Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right of
Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1959).
10. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 9, at 849.
11. See, e.g., Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816) (authorship
of spurious poem attributed to Lord Byron); De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146
(1881) (intrusion upon childbirth).
12. See T. COOLEY, A TREATSiB ON Tim LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888).
13. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). The article
by Warren and Brandeis had a profound and almost immediate impact and "has come to be
regarded as the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American
Law." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960).
14. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 196.
15. Id. In their article, Warren and Brandeis revealed prophetic insights about the industry
of gossip: "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery." Id.
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advanced in the article had developed into four independent torts. 16
"False light in the public eye" was one of these torts. 7
False light privacy cases involve publicized misinformation that
creates a false impression about the life or behavior of an individual.18
The publication need not be degrading or highly personal, and in
fact, may present the plaintiff "more favorably than reality war-
rants."' 9 In a false light action, the publication need not be defam-
atory,20 although the publication frequently is defamatory. 2' In order
to be actionable, the injurious publication must be highly offensive
to a reasonable person.22 The publication must attribute to the
plaintiff characteristics, actions, or beliefs that are false, thereby
portraying plaintiff in a false light.23 The essence of a false light
claim is that publication of the falsehoods injures the plaintiff's
dignity. 24
Courts throughout the United States have split on the question of
whether false light claims can be clearly distinguished from libel
claims.2 California courts have traditionally viewed false light as an
independent tort which shares certain elements of a libel action, 26 yet
differs from that tort in a few significant respects. 27 California Civil
16. See Prosser, supra note 13, at 389. The four separate torts articulated by Prosser
include: (1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage,
of the plaintiff's name or likeness. Id.
17. Id.
18. See REsTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
19. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 296 (1983).
20. See Zolich, Laudatory Invasion of Privacy, 16 CEv-MAR. L. REv. 532 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Bennet v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) (public accusation of
theft); Linehan v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P.2d 326 (1955) (public statement that
plaintiff not lawfully married).
22. RFSTATEMIENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976). See Strickler v. National Broadcasting
Co., 167 F. Supp. 68, 71 (1958) (the trier of fact must determine whether fictitious allegations
of plaintiff's conduct during an airplane crisis would be objectionable to a reasonable person);
Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 748, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 415
(1962) (hypersensitive plaintiff who claimed mental anguish as result of publication describing
his teenage romance and marriage, will not be protected by this cause of action, since the
protection afforded must be restricted to "ordinary sensibilities").
23. RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment b (1976).
24. See Zimmerman, supra note 19, at 296-97.
25. Note, Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co.: North Carolina Rejects the False
Light Invasion of Privacy Tort, 63 N.C.L. REv. 767, 770 (1985).
26. See Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 120, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 214(1961). The court explained the distinction between the two torts: "The right of privacy
concerns one's own peace of mind, while the right of freedom from defamation concerns
primarily one's reputation." Id. at 116, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
27. See, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 79, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39-40
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Code section 45 defines libel as a false and unprivileged publication
which exposes any person to hatred or ridicule, or which has a
tendency to injure that person in their occupation.2 Several com-
mentators have suggested that the false light tort is merely an
unnecessary duplication of the cause of action that exists under the
statutory definition of libel.29
The lingering debate over the two torts focuses primarily on the
extent to which the false light tort is intended to protect interests
different from those interests protected by defamation actions.30 Some
jurisdictions have followed Prosser's basic tenet that false light, like
defamation, is primarily intended to protect the reputational interest
of individuals. 3' Prior to the decision in Fellows, the California courts
had frequently attempted to resolve the issue of whether false light
is primarily intended to protect and compensate for damage to the
plaintiff's reputation, or to compensate for injury to plaintiff's peace
of mind and feelings. 32 Courts must distinguish between the two torts
(1979) (libel may arise from publication of a defamatory statement to only one person); Kinsey
v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 270, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (1980) (false light requires
publicity of the falsehood to a substantial number of people). In California, a libel must
defame the plaintiff in the manner described in Civil Code section 45, while actionable false
light publicity need merely be objectionable to a reasonable person. See, e.g., Carlisle v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962) (not libelous for
a magazine article to state that when plaintiff and defendant, a well-known film actress, were
teenagers, they held hands, kissed each other and got married); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
38 Cal. 2d 273, 279-80, 239 P.2d 630, 634-35 (1952) (magazine photograph displaying husband
and wife plaintiffs above caption depicting them as "persons whose only interest in each
other was sexual," was sufficient ground to state cause of action for false light invasion of
privacy); R=sTATimENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs, § 652E comment c (1976) (plaintiff's privacy is
not invaded when unimportant false statements are made).
28. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
29. See Note, Right of Privacy: Is "False Light" Recognized in California?- Werner v.
Times-Mirror Co., 50 CA~rn. L. REv. 357, 364 (1962) (stresses that in most false light cases
another remedy exists, but when another remedy does not exist, the plaintiff's interests should
be subjugated to those of the press). See also Comment, Privacy: The Search For a Standard,
11 VAKE FoREsT L. REv. 659, 669-70 (1975).
30. Prosser distinguished the interests protected by the false light tort from libel as follows:
"The false light tort need not be defamatory .... [I]t must be something that would be
objectionable to the ordinary reasonable man under the circumstances." Prosser, supra note
13, at 400. "The false light cases obviously differ from those of intrusion, or disclosure of
private facts. The interest protected is clearly that of reputation." Id. See Note, Tort Recovery
for Invasion of Privacy, 59 NEB. L. REv. 808, 825 (1980) ("the quintescence [sic] of the false
light action is the protection of the plaintiff's reputation rather than his or her right to be
free from the public's scrutiny").
31. Fellows v. National Enquirer, 42 Cal. 3d 234, 247 n.12, 721 P.2d 97, 106 n.12, 228
Cal. Rptr. 215, 224 n.12 (1986).
32. See Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 116, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 211
(1961) ("The right of privacy concerns one's own peace of mind, while the right to freedom
from defamation concerns primarily one's reputation. The injury is mental and subjective.");
Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 35 n.16, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369
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in this way in order to determine whether the constitutional and
statutory limitations on libel actions are applicable to claims brought
under the false light theory.
B. The Constitutional Privilege and False Light Claims
The United States Supreme Court has held that state defamation
laws33 are limited by the free-speech and free-press provisions of the
first amendment.14 Prior to New York Times v. Sullivan,35 the Su-
preme Court took the view that defamatory language was not entitled
to constitutional protection.36 Defamatory language was viewed as
being of such slight social value that any benefit derived from such
language was "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. ' 37 In New York Times the Supreme Court determined the
extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press
place limits on state defamation laws. 3 The Supreme Court examined
the issue of whether the falsity of a publication should effect a
forfeiture of the constitutional protections afforded speech and press.3 9
In finding that defamatory speech is entitled to constitutional pro-
tection, the Court articulated a strong national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be robust and uninhi-
bited,4" and proclaimed: "[t]he constitutional protection does not turn
upon the 'truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered.' ,,41 The Court held that a public official could
not recover under a defamation claim without proof that the media
defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement or
n.16 (1969) (where complaint contains a specific cause of action for libel, the privacy count,
if intended to rest on allegedly false nature of the statements, is superfluous and should be
dismissed).
33. Defamation includes both libel and slander. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 44 (West 1985)
(slander); id. § 45 (libel).
34. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
35. Id.
36. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). The court explained:
[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting .or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted).
38. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
39. Id. at 271.
40. Id. at 270.
41. Id. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
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acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.42 This so-called
actual malice standard articulated in New York Times was extended
to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts43 and its companion
case, Associated Press v. Walker."
Actions brought against media defendants for invasion of privacy
claims also raise first amendment considerations. The extent, how-
ever, to which the constitutional requirements outlined in New York
Times and its progeny apply to false light privacy actions is still
unclear. In 1967, the Supreme Court first considered the conflict
between the first amendment free speech provision and the right to
privacy. 45 In Time, Inc. v. Hill,46 the plaintiff's home had been
invaded by escaped convicts, and plaintiff and his family were held
hostage for nineteen hours. 47 A few years later, a writer published a
play which was a fictionalized version of the incident. 41 In 1955, Life
magazine published an article about the play, with accompanying
photographs, which described the play as a reenactment of the actual
experiences of the Hill family and implied that certain fictitious
incidents in the play had actually occurred.49 The plaintiff alleged
that the magazine article knowingly gave a false impression that the
play was a realistic account of his family's encounter with the
convicts. 50 Hill sued for damages under a New York statute5' provid-
ing a cause of action to a person whose name or picture is used
without consent for commercial purposes.5 2
In Time, the United States Supreme Court held that the New York
Times actual malice standard of liability was applicable to actions
for false light invasion of privacy.53 The Court reasoned that the
constitutional protections for speech and press embrace all matters
of public interest and do not bear an "inverse ratio to the timeliness
and importance of the ideas seeking expression. '54 Therefore, al-
42. Id. at 279-80.
43. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
44. Id. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker were decided in
the same opinion. Id. at 130.
45. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 378.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 377.
50. Id. at 376-77.
51. Plaintiff brought this action under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50, 51. Id.
at 376.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 387-88.
54. Id. at 388 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941)).
360
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though the magazine article might not have been a matter of great
importance to the public, the article was worthy of constitutional
protection. 5 The Time court also emphasized the serious impediment
to free speech which would arise by requiring verification of the
facts contained in a news article.5 6 To allow the plaintiffs to bring a
privacy claim against a media defendant on a mere negligence theory
would inhibit the sort of debate on public issues that is protected by
the first amendment.5 7 Thus, the Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill deter-
mined that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press
precluded recovery on a false light claim with regard to matters of
public interest, without proof that the defendant had acted with
actual malice.58
The present authority of Time, Inc. v. Hill is somewhat unclear
following more recent defamation cases. In a 1971 libel case,
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 9 the United States Supreme Court
extended the actual malice standard beyond public officials and public
figures to all "matters of public or general concern." 6 A few years
later this position was repudiated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.6 1
Gertz was a lawyer who represented the family of a youth who was
killed by a policeman.6 2 The defendant published an article alleging
that Gertz had arranged a "frame-up" of the policeman, and that
Gertz was a communist with a criminal record.63 The Court in Gertz
held that in a defamation action the actual malice standard is applicable
only to public officials and public figures."' A private individual, such as
55. Id. at 388. The court explained:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or
comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One
need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of
published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and
public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant
of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of
life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and press.
Id.
56. Id. at 389.
57. Id. The court stressed that even negligence would be an elusive standard, especially
when the content of the speech affords no warning of the prospective harm to another: "a
negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might
assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a
name, picture or portrait." Id.
58. Id. at 387-88.
59. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
60. Id. at 48.
61. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
62. Id. at 325.
63. Id. at 325-26.
64. Id. at 345.
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the plaintiff in Gertz, need only show that the defendant was negligent
in failing to determine the truth or falsity of the published statement
in order to satisfy United States Constitutional requirements.65
The majority in Gertz noted the importance of distinguishing
among defamation plaintiffs since private individuals are more vul-
nerable to injury than public individuals. 6 The Court explained that
public figures generally have greater access to the media than private
individuals, and thus have a more realistic opportunity to counteract
false statements.6 7 More importantly, private individuals are more
deserving of protection against defamation. Unlike public figures,
private individuals generally have not thrust themselves to the fore-
front of a particular controversy, thereby voluntarily exposing them-
selves to an increased risk of defamatory falsehoods concerning
them.68
The effect of Gertz upon the holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill is still
uncertain.6 9 Gertz represents a repudiation of the view that the actual
malice standard must apply to all defamation actions arising out of
a matter of "public interest.' '70 The reasoning of Gertz could also
be applied to false light actions brought by private individuals. If
the rule from Time, Inc. v. Hill were modified in accordance with
Gertz, then the New York Times actual malice rule would apply to
plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures, and the negligence
rule would apply to private plaintiffs. 71
In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,72 the United States
Supreme Court sustained a recovery on a false light invasion of
privacy theory.73 In Cantrell, the plaintiffs' privacy claim was based
on false and inaccurate statements contained in a news article about
the destitute family of the victim of a bridge disaster.7 4 The Cantrells
alleged that the false story subjected them to ridicule and pity.75 The
65. Id. at 347. The court decided that as long as states do not impose liability without
fault, the states are entitled to determine the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher
of defamatory statements injurious to a private individual. Id.
66. Id. at 344.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 345. A public individual, on the other hand, has relinquished part of the interest
in the protection of the individual's own good name, and consequently has a less compelling
call for redress of injury inflicted by a defamatory falsehood. Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652E comment d (1976).
70. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment d (1976).
72. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
73. Id. at 254.
74. Id. at 247-48.
75. Id. at 248.
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plaintiffs also claimed that they suffered "outrage, mental distress,
shame, and humiliation" as a result of the article. 76 The Court held
that the newspaper was liable for printing the false statements since
the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the story
had been printed with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of
its contents, thereby meeting the New York Times actual malice
standard. 77 The Court, however, bypassed the opportunity to address
the question of whether a state may apply a negligence standard of
liability in false light actions involving a private individual, or whether
the constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies
to all false light cases. 71
C. Trends in California False Light Cases
California courts have recognized a cause of action for invasion
of privacy since the landmark California decision of Melvin v. Reid.79
In Melvin, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy based upon the
publication of true but discrediting events in the plaintiff's past. 0
Later cases extended the scope of an actionable invasion of privacy
to include recovery based on offensive publicity that was false."' For
example, in Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios,82 the court upheld a
complaint based upon a movie studio's publicity stunt. In Kerby, the
defendant had mailed out one thousand copies of a letter, signed
with the name of the plaintiff, 3 which suggestively invited the male
addressees to a rendezveous at a movie theater.8 4 The plaintiff brought
76. Id.
77. Id. at 252-53. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
78. Id. at 250-51. The court decided not to rule on this question because proper objections
were not made at trial. Id. at 250.
79. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
80. Id. In Melvin, a reformed prostitute who had been tried and acquitted of murder
seven years earlier, sued the defendants for invasion of privacy after defendants aired a motion
picture ("The Red Kimono") based on true facts of the plaintiff's past. The court affirmed
her right to recover damages for invasion of privacy, stating:
[Plublication by respondents of the unsavory incidents in the past life of appellant
after she had reformed, coupled with her true name, was not justified by any
standard of morals or ethics known to us and was a direct invasion of her inalienable
right guaranteed to her by our [California] Constitution, to pursue and obtain
happiness.
Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93.
81. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 213, 127 P.2d 577, 581 (1942).
82. Id. at 214, 127 P.2d at 582.
83. The name of the plaintiff was also the name of the lead female character in a new
film produced by the defendant. Id. at 208-09, 127 P.2d at 578-79.
84. Id.
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an action for invasion of privacy, but did not pursue a libel claim. 5
The Kerby court noted that "[t]he letter complained of here might
very well have formed the basis of a charge of libel," but nevertheless
upheld the complaint on the independent ground of invasion of
privacy.16
Ten years after Kerby, the California Supreme Court recognized a
cause of action for false light for the first time.17 In Gill v. Curtis
Publishing Co.,88 the court upheld a complaint based upon the
publication of a photograph of a husband and wife, taken as they
sat in an amorous pose, to illustrate what the magazine article
described as a "wrong" kind of love, "founded upon 100 per cent
sex attraction." 89 The California Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiffs had adequately stated a cause of action for false light because
the publication depicted the plaintiffs as persons whose only interest
in each other was sexual, a characterization that might seriously
impinge upon their sensibilities. 90 The plaintiffs alleged injuries and
damages in substantial compliance with the statutory cause of action
for libel.9' The court maintained, however, that the right of privacy
was "independent of the common rights of property, contract, rep-
utation, and physical integrity. 92 Furthermore, in discussing the
standard and measure of damages, the court focused on the allegation
of mental distress rather than on injury to reputation, and held that
pleading injury to peace of mind was sufficient to sustain a cause
of action for false light. 93
California courts have long recognized the distinction between the
injury sustained in libel and false light cases. 94 The courts, however,
85. Id. at 214, 127 P.2d at 581.
86. Id. at 213-14, 127 P.2d at 581. The court further stated that the plaintiff would be
entitled to bring a privacy claim even if she had failed to post a bond for costs, which was
then required to maintain a suit for defamation. Id.
87. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 275, 239 P.2d at 632.
90. Id. at 279, 239 P.2d at 634.
91. Id. at 276, 239 P.2d at 632. Libel is defined as "a false and unprivileged publication
by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes
any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or
avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." CAL. Civ. CODE § 45
(vest 1982). The complaint in Gill alleged that the defendant's publication had "caused
plaintiffs to be held up to public scorn, ridicule, hatred, contempt and obloquy and did rob
and deprive plaintiffs of the benefits of public confidence, respect and esteem and injure said
plaintiffs in their business and social contacts and associations and in their reputations and
health." Gill, 38 Cal. 2d at 276, 239 P.2d at 632.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 281, 239 P.2d at 635.
94. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291
364
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have been inconsistent in applying statutory limitations on libel claims
to false light cases. For example, in Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios,9
the Court of Appeal for the Second District held that the plaintiff
was not precluded from bringing her claim even though she did not
comply with a California statute requiring a bond for costs to be
filed in libel actions. 96 In Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip-
ment,97 the same court failed to consider the possible applicability of
the libel statute requiring proof of special damages98 to false light
claims. 9 In Fairfield, the plaintiff was an attorney who brought a
false light action based on an advertisement which falsely stated that
the plaintiff was a satisfied user of the defendant's business ma-
chine. 00 Although Civil Code section 45a had been enacted several
years prior to the Fairfield decision, the court made no mention of
a possible relationship to false light actions, and allowed the plaintiff
to prevail without proof of special damages, as would be required
in a libel action. 101
The first case to apply a statutory limitation on recovery for libel
to a false light action was Werner v. Times-Mirror Co.'02 In Werner,
P.2d 194 (1955). In Fairfield, plaintiff was an attorney who sought to prove that he had been
ridiculed by other lawyers on account of an advertisement that stated he was a satisfied user
of defendant's machine, when in fact he was not. The court explained:
The gist of the cause of action in a privacy case is not injury to the character or
reputation, but a direct wrong of a personal character resulting in injury to the
feelings without regard to any effect which the publication may have on the property,
business, pecuniary interest, or the standing of the individual in the community. The
right of privacy concerns one's own peace of mind, while the right to freedom from
defamation concerns primarily one's reputation. Id. at 86, 291 P.2d at 197 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). Based on this distinction, the Fairfield court found that
the plaintiff was entitled to recovery upon proof of injury to the plaintiff's feelings,
without proof of further, special damages.
Id. at 89-90, 291 P.2d at 198-99.
95. 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942).
96. Id. at 214, 127 P.2d at 581-82. The statute provided in pertinent part:
In an action for libel or slander the Clerk shall, before issuing the summons
therein, require a written undertaking on the part of the plaintiff in the sum of five
hundred dollars, with at least two competent and sufficient sureties, . . . to the
effect that if the action be dismissed or the defendant recover judgment, that they
will pay such costs and charges as may be awarded against the plaintiff by judgment.
... An action brought without filing the undertaking required shall be dismissed.
1872 Cal. Stat. ch. CCCLXXVII, sec. 1, at 533 (Act concerning actions for libel and slander).
97. 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955).
98. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
99. Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 89-90, 291 P.2d 194, 199.
100. Id. at 85, 291 P.2d at 196.
101. Id. at 89-90, 291 P.2d at 199. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover general
damages without a showing of specific loss, and noted that: "The fact that damages resulting
from an invasion of the right of privacy cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard is not
a bar to recovery." Id. at 88, 291 P.2d at 198.
102. 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961).
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the claim for false light invasion of privacy was based on false
statements in an article published by the Los Angeles Times con-
cerning the impending marriage of the plaintiff, and certain events
in his past.103 The court confronted the issue of whether under Civil
Code section 48a,104 a libel statute, the plaintiff should be allowed
to proceed with his false light claim for general damages without
alleging that the defendant had refused to comply with a timely
demand for a retraction. 0 5 If section 48a was found to apply to false
light actions, the plaintiff would be unable to recover general damages
without proof of a refused demand for a retraction.' 6 The Werner
court concluded that section 48a represents a legislative declaration
of public policy concerning rights of action against media defendants
based on libelous statements. 0 7 The court refused to allow an "ev-
asion" of the statutory protections set out in section 48a in cases
where the allegedly false publication was libelous.10 8 To allow the
action to proceed with respect to non-libelous but allegedly false
publications would clearly dilute the effect of the libel statute. 09
Therefore, since the plaintiff in Werner had failed to demand a
timely retraction, he was precluded from recovering general dam-
ages."10
The California Supreme Court adopted the Werner holding in
Kapellas v. Kofman."' In Kapellas, the privacy claim of a political
103. Id. at 114-15, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11.
104. California Civil Code section 48a provides in pertinent part:
In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a
slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages
unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter
provided .... 'Special damages' are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves
that he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or
occupation, including such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he
has expended as a result of the alleged libel, and no other.
CAL. Cirv. CODE § 48 (West 1982).
105. 193 Cal. App. 2d at 121-22, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
106. CAL. Crv. CODE § 48a. See supra note 104.
107. 193 Cal. App. 2d at 123, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 216. In an earlier decision, Werner v.
Southern California Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950), the California
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 48a. That court held that the California
Legislature might reasonably conclude that the public interest in the dissemination of news
outweighs the potential injury to an individual following publication of a libelous statement.
Id. at 128, 216 P.2d at 830. Furthermore, the court found that the legislature "may properly
encourage and protect news dissemination by relieving newspapers and radio stations from all
but special damages resulting from defamation, upon the publication of a retraction." Id.
108. 193 Cal. App. 2d at 121-22, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
109. Id. at 123, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
110. Id. at 120-22, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
111. 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
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candidate was founded on the publication of false statements about
her children allegedly drawn from the local "police blotter. 11 2 Since
the plaintiff's false light action was based on the allegedly false
nature of the editorial statements, the court determined the action
was substantively equivalent to a libel claim."3 The court concluded
that the false light claim must meet the same requirements as a libel
claim, including proof of actual malice and demand for a retraction
pursuant to section 48a." '4 Thus, at the time Fellows v. National
Enquirer was decided, California law remained unsettled concerning
the applicability of all defamation statutes to false light claims.
Although the California Supreme Court had determined that the
retraction demand requirement of Civil Code section 48a applies to
false light cases, plaintiffs were still able to avoid the special damage
requirement of Civil Code section 45a by bringing a false light claim
rather than a libel claim.
II. THE CASE
A. The Facts
On August 17, 1982, the National Enquirer published a photograph
of television producer Arthur Fellows with actress Angie Dickinson,
over the caption "Angie Dickinson-Dating a Producer.""' 5 A brief
article accompanying the photograph proclaimed: "Gorgeous Angie
Dickinson's all smiles about the new man in her life-TV producer
Arthur Fellows. Angie's steady-dating Fellows all over TinselTown,
and happily posed for photographers with him as they exited the
swanky Spago restaurant in Beverly Hills. 11 6 Fellows immediately
demanded a retraction under California Civil Code section 48a,17
asserting that he "had never dated Miss Dickinson, is not 'the new
man in her life', and has been happily married to Phyllis Fellows
for the last 18 years.""' The Enquirer refused to print a retraction." 9
112. Id. at 26-27 n.2, 459 P.2d at 914 n.2, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63 n.2.
113. Id. at 35 n.16, 459 P.2d at 921 n.16, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 369 n.16.
114. Id. The court further noted that since the complaint contained a specific cause of
action for libel, the false light invasion of privacy claim was superflous and should be
dismissed. Id.
115. Fellows v. National Enquirer, 42 Cal. 3d 234, 236, 721 P.2d 97, 98, 228 Cal. Rptr.
215, 216 (1986).
116. Id.
117. Id. See supra note 104 (text of CAL.. Crv. CODE § 48a (West 1985)).
118. 42 Cal. 3d at 236, 721 P.2d at 98, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 216. Statements made at trial
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Fellows subsequently sued, alleging several causes of action including
libel and false light. 120
The libel count alleged defamation on facts extrinsic to the article
published by the Enquirer.2 1 Fellows asserted that the article was
interpreted by those who knew of his marital status to mean that he
was engaging in "improper and immoral conduct.' '1 22 The false light
action was based on the same factual allegations. 23 Both causes of
action alleged that the Enquirer had published the article with knowl-
edge that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for
whether or not they were false. 24
The Enquirer demurred to the complaint, attacking both the libel
and false light claims on the ground that special damages had not
been pleaded with sufficient specificity. 25 The Enquirer also argued
that the false light claim was redundant of the libel claim and should
therefore be dismissed. 26 After making several amendments to his
complaint, 27 Fellows withdrew his libel claim but proceeded with the
false light cause of action. 128 Fellows conceded that he had not
suffered any special damages and sought general damages only for
shame, mortification, and hurt feelings stemming from the invasion
of privacy. 129
The trial court dismissed the action, stating that under California
Civil Code section 45a, which governs the damages requirement for
libel actions, Fellows was required to prove special damages in order
indicated that the Enquirer photograph had been taken as Fellows and Dickinson left a
restaurant after dining with Mrs. Fellows and one or two other people. Id. at n.3.
119. 42 Cal. 3d at 236, 721 P.2d at 98, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
120. Id. at 236, 721 P.2d at 98, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 217. Fellows also claimed intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress and "conscious disregard." Mrs. Fellows was
added as a plaintiff in the latter causes of action. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 236-37, 721 P.2d at 98, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 237-38, 721 P.2d at 98-99, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18. The trial court dismissed
the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the ground that Fellows
had failed to sufficiently allege "outrageous conduct", a necessary element of such a cause
of action. Fellows v. National Enquirer, 211 Cal. Rptr. 809, 813 n.3 (1985), rev'd 42 Cal. 3d
234 (1986) (discussion of this case is for purposes of illustration only). Pursuant to California
Rules of Court sections 976(b) and 976.1, the California Supreme Court has ordered the
Fellows opinion depublished. CAL. R. CT. 976(b), 976.1 (West Supp. 1987).
128. 42 Cal. 3d at 238, 721 P.2d at 99, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 218. Fellows filed an original
complaint and two amended complaints and the Enquirer demurred to each complaint before
the trial judge finally dismissed the suit. Id.
129. Id.
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to bring a. successful action under a false light theory. 130 The trial
court relied expressly on the decision in Kapellas v. Kofman.13 The
trial court interpreted Kapellas to mean false light claims should be
treated as identical to libel claims and thus subject to all the statutory
limitations placed on libel claims. 32 The Court of Appeal for the
Second District reversed the decision. 33 The Court of Appeal held
that the special damages requirement of libel per quod actions should
not apply since false light is an independent tort which protects
different interests than those at issue in a defamation action. 34 The
National Enquirer appealed to the California Supreme Court. 135
B. The Opinion
In Fellows v. National Enquirer3 6 the California Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the requirement of proof of special
damages in libel actions should be applied to actions brought under
the theory of false light invasion of privacy. 3 7 In an opinion written
by Justice Broussard,' 38 the supreme court focused on two distinct
issues. The first issue was whether the conceptual difference between
libel and false light justifies making actionable an otherwise consti-
tutionally protected statement.3 9 The second issue was whether the
legislative policy embodied in section 45a is applicable to false light
actions. 140 The Fellows court concluded that the policy behind section
45a is applicable to false light actions based upon defamatory pub-
lications, when those publications are not defamatory on their face. 141
1. Constitutional Considerations
In examining the applicability of a special damages requirement to
false light actions, the Fellows court stressed the importance of
130. Id.
131. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
132. See Fellows v. National Enquirer, 211 Cal. Rptr. 809, 818 (1985), rev'd 42 Cal. 3d
234 (1986). See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Fellows v. National Enquirer, 42 Cal. 3d 234, 721 P.2d 97, 228 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1986).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurring opinion. Fellows, 42 Cal. 3d at 252, 721 P.2d
at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
139. Id. at 247-48, 721 P.2d at 106, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
140. Id. at 250-51, 721 P.2d at 107-08, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
141. Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 108-09, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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carefully guarding the constitutional protections for freedom of the
press. 142 The court pointed out the danger of upsetting the delicate
balance that has developed in the law of defamation between the
protection of an individual's interest in redressing injury from false
publications and the protection of societal interests in vigorous debate
and free dissemination of the news. 143 The supreme court found that
the appellate court decision was based on a "superficially logical
syllogism" stemming from the presumed theoretical differences be-
tween false light and libel. 144 The lower court had-asserted that libel
is intended to protect reputational interests, whereas a false light
action is aimed at redressing injury to the plaintiff's feelings and
peace of mind. 45 Since section 45a is concerned only with protection
of the plaintiff's reputation,"'6 the court of appeal concluded that
the special damage rule was "wholly inapposite" to a cause of action
for false light invasion of privacy when the plaintiff is seeking
compensation for damages to personal feelings. 47
The California Supreme Court rejected this distinction in a false
light complaint based upon a defamatory publication. 4 Even if libel
and false light actually protect separate and distinct interests, such a
conceptual difference does not warrant an abandonment of the
constitutional protections granted to the press. 14 9 Citing New York
Times v. Sullivan,50 the Fellows court noted the importance of
balancing the individual interest in reputation against the constitu-
tional interest of free speech.' 5' The supreme court asserted that the
existing balance results in the protection of some defamatory speech
because a certain amount of "breathing space" is necessary to
maintain the vitality of the freedoms of speech and press.5 2 Although
a false light action redresses a different form of injury than a
defamation action, the court explained that this difference does not
142. Id. at 252, 721 P.2d at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227-28. In her concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Bird reiterated the importance of these constitutional concerns, particularly as
applied to actions brought by public officials. Id. at 252-53, 721 P.2d at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr.
at 228.
143. Id. at 248, 721 P.2d at 106, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
144. Id. at 247, 721 P.2d at 105, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 247-48, 721 P.2d at 105-06, 228 Cal Rptr. at 224.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 247-48, 721 P.2d at 106, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
149. Id.
150. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
151. Fellows, 42 Cal. 3d at 248, 721 P.2d at 106, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
152. Id.
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lessen the importance of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public
discourse" by the press. 153 Furthermore, the constitutional protections
afforded defamatory statements in the interest of providing a gen-
erous zone of lawful speech should not be abrogated merely because
the statements contain a privacy-invading element.'"
2. Legislative Policy Behind Section 45a
The Fellows court explained that in most cases where defamation
limitations has been applied to false light claims, the courts readily
acknowledged the theoretical differences in the interests protected by
the two torts. 5 5 But the court also recognized that these different
interests may be implicated by identical conduct.'56 The Fellows court
relied on the case of Werner v. Times Mirror Co., 1 7 which dealt
with this same issue. In Werner, a public figure brought suit based
on an article in the Los Angeles Times which contained false and
misleading facts about his past.158 Werner brought suit for false light
type invasion of privacy, rather than for defamation, but failed to
make a demand for a retraction before filing suit, as was required
for libel actions under California Civil Code section 48a. 159 The Court
of Appeal for the Second District discussed whether defamation
restrictions should be applied to false light claims even though the
torts protect different interests. 160 The court determined that when
both interests were injured by the same publication, the false light
claim should not survive if the libel claim necessarily fails due to
statutory restrictions.' 6' The Werner court reasoned that to hold
otherwise would be to ignore the declaration of public policy em-
bodied in section 48a.162
In Fellows, the California Supreme Court disagreed with the nar-
row interpretation of the policy behind California Civil Code section
45a reached by the court of appeal. 63 On its face, section 45a is
concerned only with the tort of libel, and does not purport to address
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 248-49, 721 P.2d at 106-07, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
157. 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961).
158. Id. at 113-14, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10.
159. Id. at 120-21, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
160. Id. at 119, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
161. Id. at 122-23, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 215-16.
162. Id. at 123, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
163. 42 Cal. 3d at 249, 721 P.2d at 107, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
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a cause of action for false light. 64 The supreme court also relied on
the case of MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.'65 In MacLeod, a
candidate for a local political office brought a libel suit against a
newspaper, based upon an article which implied that the plaintiff
was a communist sympathizer.' 66 The plaintiff alleged special damages
pursuant to section 45a.' 67 Justice Traynor determined that the leg-
islative purpose behind section 45a "is to protect publishers who
make statements innocent in themselves that are defamatory only
because of extrinsic facts known to the reader."' 68
The court of appeal in Fellows had interpreted this language to
mean that section 45a is concerned only with protection of plaintiff's
reputation,169 and not with protection of plaintiff's feelings as in a
privacy cause of action. 70 Therefore, the court of appeal reasoned,
the special damage requirement of section 45a is inapplicable to cases
brought under the false light theory.' 7' The supreme court disagreed
with this reading of MacLeod, finding that section 45a does not
merely protect reputational interests. 172 Instead, MacLeod suggests
that section 45a evinces a legislative intent to safeguard free speech
protections for innocent publishers no matter what form the plain-
tiff's injury happens to take. 173 The supreme court determined that
section 45a manifests a legislative finding that the imposition of
liability on a media defendant for a publication which is not defam-
atory on its face, and has not caused actual pecuniary injury, would
164. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 45a (West 1985).
165. 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959). The district court of appeal had also relied on
MacLeod, with different results.
166. Id. at 542-43, 343 P.2d at 39.
167. Id. at 543, 343 P.2d at 39.
168. Id. at 550, 343 P.2d at 43-44. The court explained:
For example, a newspaper might erroneously report that 'Mrs. A gave birth to a
child last night.' Mrs. A has been married only a month. The language used will
take on a defamatory meaning only to those who know when Mrs. A was married,
and many of them will also know that the paper made a mistake. In such a case,
general damages for loss of reputation may be trivial, and the paper's mistake may
have been innocent, for its report would not alert it to the possibility of defamation.
It is not unreasonable therefore to require proof of special damages to establish a
cause of action.
Id.
169. Reputation is the estimation in which one is generally held by others. VEBSrER's TinUR
NEW ITmRNATioNAL DICoINARY 1929 (1981).
170. 211 Cal. Rptr. 809, 822 (1985). See supra note 127 and accompanying text (the
California Supreme Court has ordered this opinion depublished).
171. 211 Cal. Rptr. at 824. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (the California
Supreme Court has ordered this opinion depublished).
172. Fellows, 42 Cal. 3d at 249, 721 P.2d at 107, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
173. Id.
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place too great a burden on the editorial process and would interfere
with the free dissemination of the news. 174 The court explained that
even though the plaintiff had deleted injury to reputation from his
complaint and was seeking to recover only for injury to his sensibil-
ities, "such tactic could not alter the legislative judgment that such
injuries alone are inadequate to outweigh the burden on free press.' 1 75
The supreme court decision in Fellows also rejected the appellate
court view that adequate protection is afforded innocent publishers
by the constitutional requirement of proving actual malice. 76 The
supreme court noted that this objection could be raised about virtually
all restrictions on defamation actions that are not constitutionally
compelled. 77 While the argument might be raised that any false
statement published with actual malice should automatically be grounds
for a civil remedy, the supreme court explained that such reasoning
is flawed. 178 This reasoning assumes both the falsity of the statement
and the actual malice on the part of the defendant. Since both
determinations must be made by the jury, 79 the unpredictability of
jury verdicts would pose a considerable threat to a media defendant.1 80
The Fellows court determined that such a potential burden would
clearly inhibit freedom of the press, and would therefore be unjus-
tified absent a showing of special damages.' 8'
Finally, the Fellows court recognized that almost every published
defamation would support an action for false light as well as an
action for libel. 82 Therefore, plaintiffs should not be allowed to
circumvent the special damage requirement of section 45a simply by
suing only for false light rather than libel.'83 Circumvention in this
way would defeat the legislative purpose of providing a "zone of
protection for the operation of a free press."'' Based on these
174. Id. at 250, 721 P.2d at 107-08, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 250, 721 P.2d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
178. Id. at 250-51, 721 P.2d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
179. Id.
180. Id. The court pointed out that a participant in judicial proceedings may be utterly
free from malice, and yet in the eyes of the jury be open to imputation; or he may be cleared
by the jury of the imputation, and still have to withstand the expense and distress of harassing
litigation. "With such possibilities hanging over his head, he cannot be expected to speak with
that free and open mind which the administration of justice demands." Id. at 251, 721 P.2d
at 108, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 227. (quoting from Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation 9
COLUM. L. Rv. 463, 469-70 (1909)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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arguments, the Fellows court held that the public policy embodied
in section 45a is also applicable to an action for false light based
upon a defamatory publication.' 85
Ill. LEGAL RAIFICATIONS
The holding in Fellows renders the special damage requirement of
California Civil Code section 45a applicable to false light.' 86 Under
Fellows, a plaintiff bringing a false light claim based on a publication
that is libelous per quod must prove special damages.'87 This holding
clearly diminishes the viability of the false light cause of action, since
pecuniary losses are frequently not associated with an injury to a
plaintiff's "peace of mind."'8 8 Unless a plaintiff can prove that some
form of special damages arose from this injury to peace of mind,
that plaintiff will be unable to prevail in a false light action.
The Fellows holding expressly applies only to false light statements
which are not defamatory on their face.'89 The opinion does not
purport to apply to other forms of invasion of privacy, such as
public disclosure of private facts' 9° or misappropriation' 9' of plain-
tiff's name or likeness.' 92
Some important questions, however, are left unanswered by Fel-
lows. The court did not address the issue of whether the statutory
requirement for proof of special damages would apply to a false
light claim based on language that is not defamatory.' 93 Courts
dealing with this question in the future will probably rely on dicta
in Fellows which emphasizes the importance of maintaining judicial
protections for freedom of the press. A court might find that since
185. Id.
186. Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227. A substantial majority of states
extend additional protections to publishers by implementing a special damages requirement.
Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
187. Id. at 236, 721 P.2d at 97, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
188. There are, however, a few situations in which pecuniary losses might arise from injury
to privacy interests. One example would be expenses for pyschiatric treatment following an
injury to plaintiff's peace of mind. See generally CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE
BAR, CALIFoRNIA ATToR, aY's DuiAoEs GUIDE app. § 25 (damages recoverable for emotional
injuries).
189. 42 Cal. 3d at 251 n.13, 721 P.2d at 109 n.13, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227 n.13.
190. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. 42 Cal. 3d at 251 n.13, 721 P.2d at 109 n.13, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227 n.13. The court
noted that in the public disclosure of private facts context, for example, the policies of section
45a are inapposite, since the injurious nature of the report should have been apparent on its
face and the question of innocent mistake does not arise. Id.
193. See Fellows, 42 Cal. 3d 234, 721 P.2d 97, 228 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1986).
374
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an injury based on a non-defamatory publication is likely to be
somewhat less serious than one stemming from a libelous statement,
a level of protection should be afforded the media defendant that is
at least as high as the protection provided under a defamation claim.
Therefore, under this viewpoint, a showing of special damages would
probably be required.
Finally, the question still remains after Fellows whether there are
any other restrictions placed on defamation actions that would not
also be applicable to false light claims.194 In focusing on the impor-
tance of safeguarding the freedoms of speech and press, however,
the Fellows court has sent a clear signal to the lower courts. Under
Fellows, the California Supreme Court has directed lower courts to
avoid unnecessary circumvention of statutes aimed at protecting the
free dissemination of the news. Thus, additional limitations on libel
may be extended to false light actions, making the viability of the
false light tort even more sharply diminished.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Fellows v. National Enquirer, the California Supreme Court
held that whenever a claim of false light invasion of privacy is raised,
the plaintiff must plead and prove special damages. The court found
that the policy behind California Civil Code section 45a, which
requires a showing of special damages in libel actions, is equally
applicable to false light claims. According to the court, the special
damages requirement manifests a legislative determination that lia-
bility imposed for a publication which affords no warning of its
defamatory nature and has not caused actual pecuniary injury, would
place too great a burden on the editorial process and would hamper
the free dissemination of the news. Since virtually every defamation
would support an action for false light, exempting such claims from
the special damages requirement would render the statute a nullity.
In holding that the plaintiff must prove special damages in order to
prevail in a false light action based upon a defamatory publication,
the California Supreme Court has greatly reduced the scope of the
false light invasion of privacy tort.
Jeanne Ellen Courtney
194. Id.
°
